el objetivo de este trabajo es defender que la actual crisis es consecuencia de la inmadurez metodológica de la propia Economía. En la primera parte, se discute con Simon que la Economía no hace predicciones como una ciencia física tal y como considera M. Friedman. En la segunda, siguiendo a K. Popper, se cuestiona que las leyes económicas tengan la capacidad para hacer profecías sobre el futuro y la historia del hombre como creyó K. Marx. Y por último se concluye (...) —tomando como referencia la teoría de la ciencia de Th. Kuhn— que la Economía es una ciencia preparadigmática que no cuenta con los instrumentos necesarios para «cuantificar» la acción humana y, por consiguiente, es incapaz de predecir su comportamiento en términos económicos. (shrink)

O tema da natureza da virtude e de sua transmissibilidade atravessa quase todos os diálogos da juventude de Platão, isto é, os considerados “diálogos socráticos”. Este adquire uma relevância central no Protágoras e no Mênon, o qual se abre exatamente com a interrogação acerca da maneira de adquirir a virtude. No curso do diálogo, a arete assume um significado eminentemente político: Mênon pergunta a Sócrates como se pode obter sucesso no campo político, como se pode adquirir reconhecimento social. A tese (...) em torno a qual se desenvolve a conversação assume a identidade de virtude e conhecimento (episteme). Todavia, a consequência que deriva da assunção desta tese, isto é, o princípio com base no qual a virtude, enquanto conhecimento, seja ensinável, é refutado por meio do célebre “argumento empírico”: a ausência de homens capazes de transmitir a sua virtude aos filhos demonstra que essa não é ensinável, e ,portanto, não é conhecimento. Sócrates propõe, então, situar na opinião correta (orthe doxa) a fonte da virtude política. Todavia, a validade do argumento empírico resulta muito incerta, uma vez que parece fundar-se na ambiguidade do significado do termo didakton, que quer dizer seja “ensinável” seja efetivamente “ensinado”. Também a tentativa de fundar a virtude na theia moira deve ser tratada com certo ceticismo. Na realidade, Sócrates alude, no fim do diálogo, à possibilidade de que exista um homem que seja virtuoso e que seja também capaz de ensinar a virtude a outro homem: este homem extraordinário é naturalmente o próprio Sócrates. (shrink)

O Teeteto de Platão é um diálogo maiêutico não propositivo. Nele, Platão não apresenta a sua própria epistemologia, mas discute as posições de alguns autores contemporâneos, entre os quais Protágoras. Ele aplica o procedimento maiêutico à doutrina protagoreana para demonstrar que uma semelhante concepção não é sustentável.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rhetoric of Parody in Plato's MenexenusFranco V. TrivignoIn Plato's Menexenus, Socrates spends nearly the entire dialogue reciting an epitaphios logos, or funeral oration, that he claims was taught to him by Aspasia, Pericles' mistress. Three difficulties confront the interpreter of this dialogue. First, commentators have puzzled over how to understand the intention of Socrates' funeral oration (see Clavaud 1980, 17–77).1 Some insist that it is parodic, performing an (...) essentially critical function (e.g., Loraux 1986); while others claim that it is serious, in particular as an expression of Plato's political ideal (e.g., Kahn 1963).2 Adherents on both sides seem to think that the options are mutually exclusive.3 Second, commentators have had difficulty understanding why Plato would have Socrates attribute his entire oration to Aspasia (e.g., Coventry 1989, 3; Pownall 2004, 60). Most agree that this move is ironic and that it has something to do with the alleged target of the dialogue's criticism. But scholars have differed over whether the Aspasia reference is meant to implicate Pericles' funeral oration (Monoson 1998), rhetoric in general (Pownall 2004), Athens (Loraux 1986), or even Aeschines (Clavaud 1980).4 Third, scholars have struggled to make sense of the dialogue's "deliberate and fantastic anachronism" (Dodds 1990, 24). In the funeral oration, Socrates relates the history of Athens up to the King's Peace in 386 B.C., a full thirteen years after he has died. This problem has generated the least consensus, with some scholars restricting their analysis [End Page 29] to dating considerations (e.g., Dodds 1990) and at least one speculating that Socrates speaks in this dialogue as a ghost (Rosenstock 1994).5It is the contention of this article that, by understanding the rhetoric of parody in the Menexenus, one can resolve these difficulties and come to a coherent and unified understanding of the philosophical intentions of the dialogue.6 More specifically, I will show that the anachronism is a consequence of a particular parodic strategy, that of amplification; that the dialogue's parody targets not only Pericles' funeral oration in particular but funeral oratory, rhetoric, and Athens as well; and that the parody has serious philosophical implications.7 Further, I claim that the serious philosophical content is both critical and constructive. Plato subverts the civic identity and understanding of virtue encouraged by the genre of funeral oration, and he challenges its praise-based model of political discourse. At the same time, Plato's parodic criticism is not entirely negative, for it relies on alternative paradigms of civic identity, virtue, and political discourse.I. The Rhetoric of ParodyBefore turning to the Menexenus itself, I want to clarify what I mean by parody. For a working definition, I suggest that parody is "an imitation that distorts a target text, author, or genre."8 In order to make some general observations about the rhetoric of parody, I will look briefly at an exemplar of parody from Aristophanes' Frogs. I do so for three reasons: to display two strategies of parodic distortion, to show that parody can have multiple targets, and to argue that parody can have both serious and complex intentions.9In the Frogs (1331–63), Aristophanes uses at least two techniques of parodic distortion, inversion and amplification, in his extended parody of Euripides' monodies or single-actor odes.10 Parodic inversion, broadly speaking, upsets or overturns the target text by distorting the original in a way that reverses the stylistic effect or semantic intention. Parodic amplification hones in on one aspect of the target text and amplifies it to absurdity, often exposing its artificiality as a literary trope.The parodic scene features a woman who awakens, hysterical and terrified, from a god-sent dream, which has conveyed disturbing news. We find in this passage a particular kind of parodic inversion: bathos, the unexpected introduction of the vulgar, ordinary, or mundane, which undermines an otherwise somber tone.11 Consider the following excerpt:Attendants, set alight a lamp for me,Collect the dew of rivers in pitchers [End Page 30] And heat the water,So that I may wash away the god-sent dream.Oh god of the sea... (shrink)

Our goal is to prove that the golden section, however important, is not the only key to understand a mathematical-formalizing approach to the idea of beauty. Having developed, from this point of view, reading keys linked to the post-modern, it is necessary to link together the multiple rivulets of knowledge that gather in this direction. Moreover the canons of the approaches presented up to now are very indicative for the understanding of many aspects of beauty, which however depends on the (...) historical moment and the cultures created in the various civilizations. Therefore we can affirm that there is no effective definition of "beauty" that can be codified through fixed canons, but that the concept is expressed by a series of stratifications and interpretations that tend to link several major variations, expressing the various answers given by man to the question: what is the beauty? (shrink)

Biological and Neuroscientific Foundations of Philosophy is an authoritative text addressing both academicians and students, and proposes an integrated and holistic view of scientific study and presents a new paradigm by which to study philosophy. It highlights, in a systematic and sufficiently simple manner, the fundamental role of neuroscience, neuropsychology and biology within philosophical reflection.

L’Autore di questo libro è noto per le sue vitrioliche critiche al web e in generale alla comunicazione elettronica. Ma questo libro è la prova che non si tratta di neo-luddismo, vale a dire di una opposizione a priori all’innovazione tecnologica. L’Autore semplicemente richiama il dovere di valutare le “ricadute” del progresso tecnico, sia sociali che psicologico-individuali. L’eccesso delle informazioni, rapide e varie, può determinare una grave de-concentrazione, ansia immotivata, disorientamento. In questo libro si indicano le condizioni per un progresso (...) tecnico non alienante, in cui l’equilibrio fra ragione ed emotività sia garantita, in vista di un nuovo umanesimo. (shrink)

This volume relating to the [university] preparatory course aims to give a summary exposition... about the origins and developments of existentialist thought in the 19th and 20th centuries, its internal diversification and opposition, and its relations with Marxism--Translated from back cover.

Although the term ontology is absent from Plato’s works, his thinking undoubtedly belongs to the prehistory of this discipline. In his dialogues, one finds many observations concerning what exists and how it exists. Plato’s metaphysics is based on the fundamental distinction between two kinds of entities, namely intelligible forms and sensible particulars. This diairesis is presented in different but all compatible ways. The ontological difference between forms and sensible objects implies a causal priority: according to Plato, this priority corresponds to (...) the proteron-hysteron scheme mentioned by Aristotle. The last part of the essay is devoted to the idea of the good and the problems related to its ontological status. (shrink)

O propósito deste ensaio é o de investigar as razões pelas quais a educação de Alcibíades por Sócrates não é tão exitosa quanto a educação de Sócrates por Diotima. Em outras palavras: qual é o motivo da derrota de Sócrates enquanto educador? Segundo a minha interpretação, enquanto Sócrates aprende de Diotima a scala amoris com a separação ontológica entre entidades materiais e imateriais, isto é, ideais, Alcibíades não recebe esta mesma teoria de Sócrates. A falta deste conhecimento (isto é, dos (...) princípios metafísicos do platonismo) é a razão pela qual Alcibíades pode propor a Sócrates a troca da verdade (isto é, da verdadeira virtude) pela opinião (a beleza corporal). (shrink)